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Abstract
We explore whether the known preference for default options in choice contexts—default effects—occur in altruistic contexts and
the extent to which this can be explained through appeal to social norms. In four experiments, we found that (i) participants were
more likely to donate money to charity when this was the default option in an altruistic choice context; (ii) participants perceived
the default option to be the socially normative option; (iii) perceptions of social norms mediated the relationship between default
status and charitable donations; and (iv) a transfer effect, whereby participants translated social norms they inferred from the
default option in one domain into behavior in a second, related domain. Theoretically, our analysis situates default effects within
a comprehensive body of social psychological research concerning social norms and the attitude-behavior relationship, provid-
ing novel empirical predictions. Practically, these findings highlight that the way donation policies are framed can have an im-
portant impact on donation behavior: in our third study, we found that 81% donated half of their earnings for taking part in the
experiment to charity when this was the default option, compared with only 19% when keeping the money was the default. Our
work suggests that making use of default effects could be an effective tool to increase altruistic behavior without compromising
freedom. © 2015 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
In a world where nearly 50% of the global population lives in a
state of abject poverty and 22 000 children die each and every
day, the refrain that “something must be done” is often heard
(Shah, 2013). Yet while potential solutions to deal with these
global ethical issues have been suggested, the mass population
at large has failed to adopt these measures, and the use of
coercion—such as compulsory taxes—is largely considered
unacceptable (Schuitema & Jakobsson Bergstad, 2013).
Concurrently, a growing movement has suggested that an
effective strategy to nudge individuals to make better choices
without compromising their freedom is to modify the architec-
ture in which choices are framed (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003). In
this paper, we deploy four studies to explore whether utilizing
a simple psychological phenomenon—the preference for
defaults—could constitute such a nudge used to increase
altruistic behavior. Moreover, to shed light on the psychologi-
cal mechanism driving such default effects, we test the causal
role of perceived social norms. We investigate three key issues
related to a social norms account of default effects: first,
whether social norms are inferred from a default option status;
second, whether perceived injunctive and descriptive social
norms mediate the effects of defaults on behavior; and third,
whether default effects can transfer to influence other altruistic
behavior. Taken together, our findings suggest that the default
option in a given choice context can be interpreted as being the
socially approved form of action, which in turn influences
behavior. In doing so, this paper provides both theoretical
and practical insights into how choice contexts can be struc-
tured in ways that elicit greater altruistic behavior by making
the default option that people receive altruistic and enabling
people to do good simply by “doing nothing.”
Default Effects
A default is “the choice alternative a consumer receives if
he/she does not explicitly specify otherwise” (Brown &
Krishna, 2004, p.529; see also Johnson & Goldstein, 2003;
Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, & Rabin,
2003). This preference for the default—the default bias, or
default effects (Anderson, 2003; Johnson & Goldstein, 2003;
Yu, Mobbs, Seymour, & Calder, 2010)—has been shown to
influence decision-making in a range of decisions including
insurance choices (Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, & Kunreuther,
1993), retirement plans (Choi, Laibson, Madrian, & Metrick,
2002), public pension schemes (Hedesström, Svedsäter, &
Gärling, 2007), employee saving for retirement schemes (Thaler
& Benartzi, 2004), and Internet privacy policies (Johnson,
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Bellman, & Lohse, 2002). Researchers have also begun to in-
vestigate the extent to which the default effect occurs in differ-
ent contexts (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008), how this is
moderated by the attractiveness of the options (Campbell-Arvai,
Arvai, & Kalof, 2012), the neural structures underlying default
effects (Yu et al., 2010), and how defaults can actually construct
preferences (Dhingra, Gorn, Kener, & Dana, 2012).
This preference for the default seems to make a dramatic
difference in real-life altruistic behavior—that is, any instance
where one individual helps another, in the absence of any
clear, immediate benefit to the self. The classic example of
altruistic default effects concerns organ donation. Certain
countries use an “opt-out” organ donation system (where one
is automatically a donor unless one registers to not be) while
others use a “consent-in” policy (where one is required to
register if one wants to be an organ donor) (Johnson & Gold-
stein, 2003). In Austria (with an opt-out policy), a staggering
99% of the population are registered organ donors, while just
across the border in Germany (which is highly similar in lan-
guage and culture, but with a consent-in policy), a mere 12%
are registered organ donors (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003).
Simply framing something as a default appears to significantly
influence the choices that people make.
The Scope of Default Effects
The first motivating question driving this paper was whether
this preference for the default can lead participants to be
nudged toward immediate selfless behavior that is in the
common interest. The potential use of default effects in
fostering behavior that promotes the greater good has been
discussed by a number of behavioral economists and is often
explained through a broadly defined behavioral economics
framework (Smith, Goldstein, & Johnson, 2013; Thaler &
Sunstein, 2003). Within behavioral economics, the dominant
method of testing altruistic behavior comes from economic
games, where participants make decisions about allocating
resources between themselves and others (Camerer, 2003).
Here, the altruistic behavior is immediate: participants act
in a way to the benefit of others, at immediate cost to
themselves.
Yet, the contexts in which default effects have been explored
thus far lack this central feature of typical altruistic behavior.
The contexts in which altruistic default effects have been previ-
ously explored—for example, organ donations (Johnson &
Goldstein, 2003) and sustainable food choices (Campbell-Arvai
et al., 2012)—do not involve this immediate cost to the actor and
consequently are somewhat atypical. For example, in registering
to be an organ donor, the cost of doing so (i.e., donating an or-
gan) will only occur—if it occurs at all—once a person has died
and no longer able to even experience this cost. Most everyday
altruistic behaviors, however—from helping in an emergency
to volunteering to donating to charity—involve an immediate
and discernible cost to the individual. Therefore, we aimed to
extend research on default effects by looking at typical altruistic
behavior involving an immediate cost to the individual to benefit
others, focusing on charitable giving, a paradigmatic example of
such altruistic behavior.
Mechanisms Underlying the Default Effects
Whymight such default effects occur? In the behavioral econom-
ics literature, it has been argued that default options can influence
choices in three main ways (see Smith et al., 2013, for a review):
(i) Defaults affect the perceived meaning of the choices and
associated actions: evidence suggests that defaults are
interpreted as being the recommended option, or as being
“implicitly endorsed” (Brown & Krishna, 2004; McKenzie,
Liersch, & Finkelstein, 2006). Similarly, recent work on the
“change-in-meaning” account of default effects has sug-
gested that default effects may occur because people attach
different meaning to behaviors they have to opt-in to per-
form, versus those they have to opt out to perform (Davidai,
Gilovich, & Ross, 2012). Supporting this, Davidai and col-
leagues show that in relation to organ donation, within a
consent-in country, donation was considered morally akin
to giving away half of one’s wealth to charity upon one’s
death, while in an opt-out country, it was considered similar
to letting others get ahead of one in line and volunteering
some time to help the poor.
(ii) Default options often require less effort for the decision-
maker: people may follow a default because they do not
want the bother of changing to the non-default option,
which may include (in organ donation, for example) ac-
quiring and mailing a change-of-consent form (Johnson
& Goldstein, 2003). Yet, effort cannot be the complete
picture, for default effects are also shown to occur in
cases where to switch to the non-default requires minimal
effort: literally, a click of a button.
(iii) Default options invoke cognitive biases, perhaps driven
by loss aversion and anchoring of decision-makers to
the existing status quo: it may be that people feel that in
some way they possess the default option, and so giving
up this endowment is perceived as a loss—which,
through loss aversion, looms heavier in the mind than
the equivalent gain achieved by changing to the non-
default option (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Ritov &
Baron, 1990). Of course, these processes are not mutually
exclusive and indeed are likely to work together—
accepting the default may save time, effort, and money
but that same default can also be perceived to be a recom-
mendation from the policy maker, indicating the socially
desirable behavior (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003).
In this paper, we focus on the first explanation: that mean-
ing is inferred from defaults. Specifically, we consider the
claim that defaults are interpreted as being the recommended
option, or as being “implicitly endorsed” (McKenzie et al.,
2006). On the “implicit endorsement” explanation, defaults
affect choices because the public perceives them as implied
endorsements by those who select them. In the case of policy
defaults, such as for organ donation, McKenzie et al. (2006)
argue that people interpret the default as the recommended
course of action set out by policymakers, and Thaler and
Sunstein (2003) further propose that the default selected by
policymakers might be interpreted as an indication of what
the majority chooses. Similarly, in a marketplace context,
Brown and Krishna (2004) posit that defaults set by adver-
tisers may be perceived as suggestions.
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Social Norms as an Explanation for Default Effects
Both the change-in-meaning account (Davidai et al., 2012) and
the implied recommendation account (McKenzie et al., 2006)
highlight that defaults are perceived in a social context, having
clear parallels with the concept of social norms. Social norms
refer to an individual’s beliefs about the common or accepted
behaviors within a group (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). The im-
plied endorsement account has been important in showing
the power that defaults have over decision-making and
highlighting the role of implicit recommendations through
which default effects may occur (McKenzie et al., 2006). As
yet, however, this research has been conducted largely in iso-
lation to that large body of research on social norms. The sec-
ond motivating question of this paper was therefore to provide
a novel experimental investigation of the implied endorsement
account for default effects through the lens of the social psy-
chological literature concerning social norms. In doing so,
we integrate previous work from behavioral economics with
theoretical insights from social psychology.
Social norms play an important role in social behavior, with
individuals often motivated to act in accordance with per-
ceived social norms (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Social norms
regulate social life, aiding in restricting selfish impulses in
favor of collective outcomes (Biel, Eek, & Gärling, 1996).
Social norms include both descriptive norms, concerning an
individual’s beliefs about how common the behavior is within
a group, and injunctive norms, which refer to an individual’s
beliefs about the approval for a specific behavior among group
members. Social norms can be perceived differently depend-
ing on which context or reference category is salient, and in-
junctive norms can be derived from institutions (e.g., what
the government believes people should do), as well as from
other community members (e.g., what most other people be-
lieve others should do). People are more likely to be influ-
enced by social norms if there is a perception of ambiguity
about what should be carried out (Crutchfield, 1955; Reno,
Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993), and if the social norms are
relevant or appropriate (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Both descrip-
tive and injunctive normative messages have been used to
promote prosocial behavior in general (e.g., Penner, Dovidio,
Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005), as well as in the specific contexts
of charitable donations (Croson & Shang, 2010) and pro-
environmental choices (Schultz & Kaiser, 2012).
We propose that default effects can be explained—at least
in part—through an attempt to follow social norms. We sug-
gest that participants perceive a default option as being the op-
tion that is both recommended (injunctive) and the one that
most people choose (descriptive), and because individuals
are motivated to act normatively, they are subsequently more
likely to follow the default option. We therefore expand upon
the work on the implied endorsement account to also consider
the extent to which default effects may arise in a given choice
context through both descriptive norms (“The default option is
what most people choose”) and general injunctive norms
(“The default option is what most people would approve of”).
Considering default effects through the lens of social norms
is fruitful because it theoretically integrates the largely isolated
research on default effects by behavioral economists to the
large body of work on social norms in social psychology. In
particular, there are three clear, still unaddressed questions that
arise from a consideration of social norms and default effects.
1. First, when something is a default, do people believe that
this is the option that most other people would choose
and approve of? Following on from evidence that defaults
are interpreted as being implied recommendations, it seems
likely that the default option would be perceived as socially
normative, relative to the non-default option.
2. Second, do these perceptions of social norms mediate default
effects? If social norms are important in explaining default
effects, we would expect that such perceptions of social norms
would mediate the effects of default options on behavior.
3. Third, if the default option is perceived to be indicative of
social norms, does awareness of this norm in the default op-
tion transfer to different situations involving similar norms?
If a default is perceived to represent a desirable action, this
perception is likely to transfer to other situations in which
the relevant norm is salient and influence behavior accord-
ingly (Reno et al., 1993). That is, the perception of an
existing social norm to perform an action—inferred
through the presence of a default—should increase the like-
lihood of performing that action in related contexts when
similar norms are still salient. Such a normative transfer ef-
fect would suggest that individuals do not merely see the
default option as being recommended in that given choice
context, but rather that they interpret the default option as
representing broader social norms.
The Present Research
In this paper, we examine the extent to which default effects
occur in immediate altruistic contexts and the role of social
norms in driving this phenomenon. We extend previous work
by investigating whether default effects could lead to actual
immediate altruistic behavior to help others both in the direct
default context and in wider altruistic contexts.
We test two core hypotheses arising from prior research.
First, previous work has suggested that default effects might
occur in altruistic contexts that involve an immediate cost to
the individual, but this has not yet been fully explored. Across
our first three studies, we test our first hypothesis that
H1: Default effects—a preference for the default option—oc-
cur in altruistic contexts that involve an immediate cost
to the individual, such as charitable giving.
Our second hypothesis concerns the role social norms play
in default effects, and had three corollaries, mapping onto the
three questions raised by the literature. Across all four studies,
we hypothesize that
H2: Social norms play an explanatory role in default effects.
H2a: Default options are perceived as socially normative
relative to the non-default option.
H2b: The perception of social norms to donate will mediate
default effects.
H2c: A transfer of default effects should occur, such that an
inferred social norm from a default option increases
the likelihood of choosing that option in related con-
texts when that norm is still salient.
Doing good by doing nothing
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STUDY 1
In this study, we explored our first hypothesis by testing for
the existence of default effects in the immediate altruistic
context of charitable giving, where individuals choose to help
others at an immediate cost to themselves. We tested whether
participants would be more likely to donate a bonus partici-
pation payment of $0.50 to an anti-poverty charity in the
developing world when this was presented as the default op-
tion, compared with when the default option was to keep the
money (H1). We explored our second hypothesis concerning
social norms by testing whether perceptions of social norms
to donate to charity were stronger when the default option
was to donate the bonus money to charity (H2a), and whether




One hundred and seventy-seven American participants (73 fe-
male) with a mean age of 32 (SD=10.73) participated in this
experiment, recruited online using Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). Amazon MTurk is a website that facilitates payment
for completing tasks posted by researchers, and such samples
have been shown to provide reliable data and be more repre-
sentative of the general population than are student samples
(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Participants com-
pleted the experiment online and were paid $0.50 for their
time, with an option of keeping an additional bonus of $0.50.
Design
The experiment had a randomized between-subject design
with two conditions: “charity default” versus “charity non-
default.” Participants first completed an unrelated filler task in-
volving estimating the number of countries in Europe and in-
dicating where one country was on a map. After ostensibly
completing the study, participants were presented with infor-
mation about payment, being told that, on top of the $0.50
payment they received for taking part in the study, they could
either keep for themselves or donate to charity an additional
$0.50 bonus. The experimental manipulation constituted
whether this money would be paid to them by default (charity
non-default), or whether it would be donated to a charity as a
default (charity non-default). All participants received identi-
cal information about the payment, where only the last sentence
was manipulated to make this donation the default or not:
[Charity default condition] As a default, this bonus money
will be donated to charity. If you would rather keep this
money as a bonus to be paid to you, however, all you have
to do is fill in an additional question to indicate this on the
next page.
[Charity non-default condition] As a default, this bonus
money will be paid to you. If you would rather us donate
this money to charity, however, all you have to do is fill
in an additional question to indicate this on the next page.
Charity Donation
The key dependent measure was whether, as described earlier,
participants chose to donate the $0.50 to charity or keep them-
selves as a bonus payment. The wording of the question was as
follows:
Would you like to follow the default and have this money
[donated to charity/paid to you as a bonus]? If you select
“No”, you will be taken to the next page to confirm you
would like to [donate this money to charity/be paid this
money yourself].
Perceived Social Norms
After making their decision, participants were asked two ques-
tions concerning perceived social norms: “I think that most
people believe that others should donate the bonus money to
charity” (Agree–disagree: 1=not at all, 7= very much); and
“Of all the people that take part in this survey, what proportion
do you think will donate this bonus money to charity?” (Slid-
ing scale from 0% to 100%). Upon completion of the study, all
participants were fully debriefed, and we gave the total money
that participants chose to donate from their bonus to charity.
Results and Discussion
Charity Donation
Our first hypothesis (H1) was supported, with results from a
chi-square test of independence demonstrating default effects
in an altruistic context: when the default option was to donate
the bonus money to charity, 35% of participants chose to do-
nate this money, compared with only 20% when the default
option was to keep the bonus money: χ2(1, N=177) = 5.24,
p= .02.
Social Norms
Results revealed that hypothesis H2a was also supported, with
independent samples t-tests showing that participants perceived
stronger social norms to donate to charity when this was the de-
fault. Participants in the charity default condition perceived
stronger injunctive social norms to donate the bonus money to
charity (M=5.01, SD=1.68) relative to when the default was
to keep the money (M=4.16, SD=1.70), t(175)=!3.34,
p< .001. Similarly, participants perceived a greater descrip-
tive social norm to donate when this was the default,
expecting that 50% of participants would donate the money
to charity when this was presented as the default
(SD= 23.07), compared with only 38% when it was not the
default (SD= 20.40), with these being significantly different,
t(169.18) =!3.53, p< .001.
Next, we conducted mediation analyses using the Preacher
and Hayes (2008) bootstrapping technique to explore whether
perceived social norms mediated the effects of default condi-
tion on donation amounts (H2b). A 95% bias-corrected boot-
strap confidence interval for the indirect effect of injunctive
norms (B=0.27) based on 10 000 bootstrap samples did not in-
clude zero (0.06–0.64), indicating that perceived injunctive
Jim A.C. Everett et al.
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norms significantly mediated the effects of condition on dona-
tion. Similarly, the same 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confi-
dence interval for the indirect effect of descriptive norms
(B=0.51) also did not include zero (0.19–1.01), again indicat-
ing that perceived descriptive norms significantly mediated the
effects of condition on donation (Table 1). When controlling
for the influence of social norms, the influence of the default
option on donations was not significant (B=0.09, p= .82).
Overall, then, in addition to showing default effects in a
charitable context (H1), we provided evidence for an explana-
tory role of social norms in explaining default effects (H2).
Participants perceived stronger social norms to donate when
this was the default (H2a), and perceptions of both descriptive
and injunctive norms to donate fully mediated the effects of
default condition on donations (H2b).
STUDY 2
In this study, we aimed to replicate the results of Study 1,
again in an immediate altruistic context where individuals
choose to help others at an immediate cost to themselves. In
this study, rather than a non-specified charity that focused pri-
marily on helping people in the developing world, we had par-
ticipants choose to donate their bonus money to a specific
environmental charity—Greenpeace. Previous work has sug-
gested that default effects could be moderated by the attrac-
tiveness of the options (Campbell-Arvai et al., 2012), and it
is known that people donate substantially more to poverty-
related charities than environmental ones (Forbes, 2013), sug-
gesting that such charities are seen as being more appropriate
receivers of donations. Given that individuals are generally
more inclined to donate to anti-poverty charities and other
charities that primarily benefit other people, we aimed to ex-
plore whether default effects would also be observed for a
“higher threshold” environmental charity. As in Study 1, we
first hypothesized that participants would be significantly more
likely to donate a bonus participation payment of $0.50 to
Greenpeace when this was presented as the default option
(H1). Additionally, we again hypothesized that when the de-
fault option was to donate to charity, participants would per-
ceive stronger social norms to donate to charity (H2a), and




One hundred and fifty American participants (55 female) with
a mean age of 34 years (SD=12.14) participated in this experi-
ment, recruited online using Amazon MTurk. Participants
completed the survey online and were paid $0.50 for their
time, with an option of keeping an additional bonus of $0.50.
Design
The experiment utilized the same randomized 1× 2 between-
subject design with two conditions as in Study 1: “charity
default” versus “charity non-default.” The dependent measures
were the same as those in Study 1, and the only feature that
differed was that the charity to which money would be donated
was Greenpeace, rather than a water poverty charity. Upon
completion of the study, all participants were fully debriefed,
and the total money that participants chose to donate from
their bonus was donated to Greenpeace. This was chosen as
representing a respected and well-known environmental charity.
Results
Charity Donation
Results from a chi-square test of independence supported H1,
demonstrating default effects such that significantly more peo-
ple donated their bonus payment to Greenpeace when this was
presented as the default. When the default option was to do-
nate the bonus money to Greenpeace, 23% of participants
chose to donate this money, compared with only 11% of par-
ticipants when the default option was to keep the bonus
money: χ2(1, N=150) = 3.89, p< .05.
Social Norms
Results from two independent samples t-tests revealed that
H2a was partially supported, with participants perceiving
stronger descriptive—but not injunctive—social norms to do-
nate to charity when this was the default. Participants expected
that 41% of participants would donate the money to charity
when this was presented as the default (SD=22.22), compared
with only 33% when to keep the money was the default
Table 1. Mediation model for the indirect effects of default condition on donations in Study 1
Outcome
Descriptive (M1) Injunctive (M2) Donation (DV)
Predictor B SE p B SE p B SE p
Condition (IV) 12.37 3.53 < .001 0.85 0.25 < .001 c’ 0.09 0.41 .82
M1 (Descriptive) b1 0.04 0.01 .001
Indirect 0.51 0.22 .01
M2 (General Inj) b2 0.32 0.14 .02
Indirect 0.27 0.14 .03
r2 = .07, F(1,175) = 12.27 p< .001 r2 = .06, F(1,175) = 11.16 p< .001 Nagelkerke’s r2 = .33
Note. The dependent variable in this analysis was coded such that 0 = keeping the money, and 1 = donating the money.
Doing good by doing nothing
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(SD=22.24), with these being significantly different, t(148)
=!2.18, p= .03. However, participants in the charity default
condition were not significantly more likely to agree with the
statement concerning the injunctive norm “I think that most
people believe that others should donate the bonus money to
charity” (M=4.43, SD=1.63) than when the default was to
keep the money (M=4.08, SD=1.62), t(148) =!1.31,
p= .19, although the means were in the predicted direction.
Finally, as in Study 1, we conducted mediation analyses to
explore whether perceived social norms mediated the effects
of default condition on donation amounts (H2b). A 95%
bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect ef-
fect of injunctive norms (B=0.68) based on 10 000 bootstrap
samples contained zero (!0.11 to 0.68), indicating that per-
ceived injunctive norms did not significantly mediate the
effects of condition on donation. Similarly, the same 95%
bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect
effect of descriptive norms (B=0.01) also contained zero
(!0.06 to 0.39), again indicating that perceived descriptive
norms did not significantly mediate the effects of condition
on donation (Table 2). There was no evidence that the default
option influenced donations independent of its effect on per-
ceived social norms (B=0.69, p= .16).
Discussion
Why might this difference between the effects of default con-
dition on social norms in Studies 1 and 2 have occurred? One
potential explanation for participants perceiving weaker social
norms when the charity was Greenpeace (Study 2) than when
it was an anti-poverty charity (Study 1) is that while stronger
social norms are perceived as a function of a default option,
social norms are clearly not exclusively perceived via a default
option. Rather, individuals often receive information about
existing social norms from a variety of sources and over a
sustained period of time (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Therefore,
given that poverty-related charities are perceived more favor-
ably than environmental charities (Forbes, 2013), a tentative
explanation is that participants’ awareness of this imbalance
may have weakened a perceived relation between the default
option and social norms. This explanation fits with work sug-
gesting that the attractiveness of the options moderates default
effects (Campbell-Arvai et al., 2012), such that default effects
is more pronounced for attractive options. Of course, future re-
search is needed to test this hypothesis more fully with regard
to social norms.
Overall, Study 2 provided further evidence for our hypothe-
sis that default effects would be observed in immediate altru-
istic contexts. However, in contrast to Study 1, social norms
did not seem to mediate this effect.
STUDY 3
In this study, we aimed to improve upon the methodologies of
Studies 1 and 2. In many real-life default options, the default
option is not merely stated (as in our studies so far), but also
preselected, such that if participants do nothing, they receive
that default option. A common default scenario often takes
the form of a checkbox that is already selected, where one
unclicks the box (and/or clicks another) if they do not wish
to follow the default, and otherwise they are not required to
do anything. A potential limitation of our first two studies is
that while a default option was clearly stated, this option was
not preselected, such that whether or not participants chose
the default they had to click an option indicating their pre-
ferred choice. While this design has its advantages—particu-
larly, in regard to controlling for the effort required by the
participants—it might not fully approximate common default
choices in the real world. Although default effects were ob-
served in both of our studies (supporting our hypotheses),
one might expect that when using clearly preselected options,
observed default effects would be even higher. Therefore, in
our third study, we used the same basic experimental design
but changed the response measure so that the default option
was preselected with a checked box, and participants could
choose to de-select this box and select the alternative, or sim-
ply do nothing to stick with the default.
A second change to the design of this study was the inclu-
sion of both general injunctive norms (i.e., perceived norms
about how one thinks other people in general think one should
behave), as well as institution-derived injunctive norms (i.e.,
perceived norms about how the policy-maker/choice architect
thinks one should act). Previous work on default effects through
the lens of the implied endorsement account has focused on the
importance of such institution-derived social norms, and so we
included both general and institutional-derived social norms to
more clearly link our work to—and distinguish it from—the
previous work by McKenzie et al. (2006).
Our overall aim was to again show default effects in an im-
mediate charitable context, as well as providing further
Table 2. Mediation model for the indirect effects of default condition on donations in Study 2
Outcome
Descriptive (M1) Injunctive (M2) Donation (DV)
Predictor B SE p B SE p B SE p
Condition (IV) 7.91 3.63 .03 0.35 0.27 .19 c’ 0.69 0.49 .16
M1 (Descriptive) b1 0.01 0.01 .48
Indirect 0.07 0.11 .52
M2 (General Inj) b2 0.68 0.01 .001
Indirect 0.24 0.20 .23
r2 = .03, F(1,148) = 4.74 p= .03 r2 = .01, F(1,148) = 1.71 p= .19 Nagelkerke’s r2 = .22
Note. The dependent variable in this analysis was coded such that 0 = keeping the money, and 1 = donating the money.
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evidence for the explanatory power of social norms. As in our
previous studies, we first hypothesized that participants would
be significantly more likely to donate a bonus participation
payment of $0.50 to charity when this was presented as the de-
fault option (H1). Second, we hypothesized that when the
default option was to donate to charity participants would per-
ceive stronger social norms to donate to charity (H2a) and that




One hundred and fifty-two American participants (81 female)
with a mean age of 35 years (SD=11.43) participated in this
experiment, recruited online using Amazon MTurk. Participants
completed the survey online and were paid $0.50 for their time,
with an option of keeping an additional bonus of $0.50. Partici-
pants were excluded if they failed a simple attention check,
whereby after being presented with a map of Europe, they were
asked to indicate which of the following countries was not in
Europe (Germany; France Italy; Poland; India). Nine partici-
pants failed this simple attention check by indicating that India
was a European country and so were excluded from subse-
quently data analysis, leaving a final sample of N=143.
Design
The experiment utilized the same basic randomized between-
subject design with two conditions as in Studies 1 and 2.
The charity and the pre-decision information about the charity
were the same as that used in Study 1.
Charity Donation
The key dependent measure was whether participants chose to
donate the $0.50 to charity or keep themselves as a bonus pay-
ment. All participants were given the same two options: “I
would like this bonus money paid to charity” and “I would like
this bonus money paid to me.” To parallel the way that default
options are often presented in online forms, the default option
from each condition was preselected with a checkbox, where
participants had the option of clicking to change their selec-
tion, or leave it as it was.
Perceived Social Norms
After making their decision, participants were asked—as be-
fore—two questions concerning perceived descriptive and
general injunctive social norms. The descriptive norm question
was identical to the previous studies, but we expanded the
general injunctive norm question to make it clear that we are
referring to other people taking the task: “I think that most
people taking this task believe that others should donate the
bonus money to charity.” Further, we also asked participants
to rate their perception of institution-derived injunctive norms:
“I think that the researchers who designed this task believe that
others should donate the bonus money to charity” (Agree–dis-
agree: 1= not at all, 7= very much).
Results
Charity Donation
Results from a chi-square test of independence showed that H1
was supported, with results demonstrating default effects such
that significantly more people donated their bonus payment to
charity when this was presented as the default. With this im-
proved methodology, when the default option was to donate
the bonus money to charity, 81% of participants chose to do-
nate this money, compared with only 19% of participants
when the default option was to keep the bonus money:
χ2(N=141) = 19.44, p< .001.
Social Norms
Results from three independent samples t-tests revealed that
H2a was supported, with participants perceiving stronger de-
scriptive and injunctive social norms to donate to charity when
this was the default. Participants expected that 47% of partici-
pants would donate the money to charity when this was pre-
sented as the default (SD=23.51), compared with only 33%
when to keep the money was the default (SD=20.23), with
these being significantly different, t(139) = 3.90, p< .001. Par-
ticipants in the charity default condition were significantly
more likely to agree with the statement concerning the general
injunctive norm “I think that most people believe that others
should donate the bonus money to charity” (M=4.73,
SD=1.67) than when the default was to keep the money
(M=3.94, SD=1.71), t(139) =2.78, p< .01. Finally, partici-
pants in the charity default condition were also significantly
more likely to agree with the statement concerning the
institution-derived injunctive norm “I think that the re-
searchers who designed this task believe that others should do-
nate the bonus money to charity” (M=5.18, SD=1.53) than
when the default was to keep the money (M=4.54,
SD=1.61), t(139) =2.42, p= .02.
As in Studies 1 and 2, we conducted mediation analyses to
explore whether perceived social norms mediated the effects
of default condition on donation amounts (H2b). As in Studies
1 and 2, we conducted mediation analyses to explore whether
perceived social norms mediated the effects of default condi-
tion on donation amounts (H2b). A 95% bias-corrected boot-
strap confidence intervals for the indirect effect of descriptive
norms (B=0.39) based on 10 000 bootstrap samples were
above zero (0.03–0.91), indicating that perceived descriptive
norms did significantly mediate the effects of condition on
donation. However, the same 95% bias-corrected bootstrap
confidence interval for the indirect effect of general injunctive
norms (B=0.25) did contain zero (!0.01 to 0.77), indicating
that perceived general injunctive norms did not mediate the
effects of condition on donation (Table 3). Finally, the confi-
dence intervals for the indirect effect of institution-derived
injunctive norms (B=0.05) also contained zero (-0.17, 0.35),
indicating that perceived institution-derived injunctive norms
did not mediate the effects of condition on donation. There
was, however, evidence that the default option did influence
donations independent of its effect on perceived social norms
(B=1.47, p< .005).
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Discussion
Overall, then, in addition to showing default effects in a chari-
table context (H1), we provided evidence for an explanatory
role of descriptive social norms in explaining default effects
(H2). Again, participants perceived stronger norms to donate
when this was the default (H2a). Most importantly, percep-
tions of descriptive—but not injunctive—norms to donate
significantly mediated the effects of default condition on dona-
tions (H2b).
It is perhaps surprising that both general and institution-
derived injunctive norms were not significant mediators, given
the theoretical relevance this has to the implied-endorsement
model of default effects (McKenzie et al., 2006). We do not
have a clear answer as to why this is the case and are reluctant
to speculate on the basis of limited data. It is possible that the
implied recommendations are stronger when coming from
accepted policymakers (e.g., the government), rather than just
the designers of an online task (e.g., “the researchers who
created this task”). It is also possible that—at least in part—
some of the results found in support of the implied endorse-
ment model were actually driven by perceptions of descriptive
norms, which would cohere with our findings across our stud-
ies that descriptive norms more consistently mediated default
effects. Whatever the potential explanation, we do not suggest
that our findings disprove or provide convincing evidence
against the implied endorsement account. Rather, future work
must be conducted to explore more fully the way that such
institution-derived social norms interact with other kinds of so-
cial norms to explain default effects. In at least some cases,
both types of norms are likely to be of importance.
STUDY 4
After finding converging evidence in Studies 1–3 for both the
existence of default effects in actual altruistic donation behav-
ior and the explanatory role of social norms, we next turned to
the third corollary of our second hypothesis, investigating
whether a transfer effect would be observed in a hypothetical
taxation policy. We predicted that a transfer effect of perceived
social norms from the initial default policy context to an actual
altruistic context would occur: if a default is perceived to
represent a normative action, this effect is likely to transfer
to other situations in which that norm is salient. Therefore,
the perception of an existing social norm to donate—inferred
through the presence of a default—should increase the likeli-
hood of donating money in related contexts when that norm
is still salient. Specifically, we hypothesized that participants
presented with information that an altruistic tax donation was
the default option would subsequently choose to actually do-
nate more money to a charity providing aid to individuals in
need (H2c). Note that in this study we were not exploring de-
fault effects directly as in the previous study, but rather using a
novel approach whereby we manipulated defaults and tested
the effects in a different context.
Method
Participants
One hundred and thirty-six US American participants (59 fe-
male), with a mean age of 34 years old (SD=13.50) partici-
pated in this experiment, recruited online using Amazon
MTurk. Participants completed the survey online and were
paid $0.50 for their time, with an option of keeping up to
$1.00 of an additional bonus.
Design
The experiment had a randomized between-subject design
with two conditions: “charity default” versus “charity non-
default.” All participants were presented with a description
of an optional (and fictional) 5% charity tax in Sweden,
followed by the experimental manipulation where this tax
was presented as either a default or not. All participants re-
ceived identical information about this tax, and only the last
sentence was manipulated to make this donation the default
versus not:
In Sweden, for the last 10 years there has been a voluntary
donation included in all citizens’ tax forms. This is an
entirely optional and anonymous additional 5% tax that is
given wholly and directly to 10 of the most effective chari-
ties, as judged by the reputable “Giving What We Can”
research centre. This 5% tax of gross income is dependent
upon individuals’ own income, such that individuals with
Table 3. Mediation model for the indirect effects of default condition on donations in Study 3
Outcome
Descriptive (M1) General Inj (M2) Institution Inj (M3) Donation (DV)
Predictor B SE p B SE p B SE p B SE P
Condition (IV) 14.48 3.71 .001 0.79 0.28 .01 0.64 0.26 .02 c’ 1.47 0.49 .003
M1 (Descriptive) b1 0.03 0.01 .02
Indirect 0.39 0.22 .08
M2 (General Inj) b2 0.32 0.16 .04
Indirect 0.25 0.19 .19
M3 (Institution Inj) b3 0.07 0.15 .64
Indirect 0.05 0.12 .67
r2 = .10, F(1,139) = 15.21
p< .001
r2 = .05, F(1,139) = 7.72
p= .006
r2 = .04, F(1,139) = 5.83
p= .02
Nagelkerke’s r2 = .22
Note. The dependent variable in this analysis was coded such that 0 = keeping the money, and 1 = donating the money.
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lower incomes contribute less in real terms than those with
high incomes…
[Charity default condition] This tax is entirely voluntary and
is a default on tax records. However, if an individual does
not want to give this additional 5%, all they have to do is fill
out an additional “opt-out” form included in all tax returns.
[Charity non-default condition] This tax is entirely voluntary
and participants can consent to if they wish to. If an individual
does want to give this additional 5%, all they have to do is fill
out an additional “consent-in” form included in all tax returns.
Attitudes Toward Altruistic Policies
After being exposed to the experimental manipulation, partici-
pants were asked two questions designed to assess their atti-
tudes toward the described charitable policy. Participants
were asked to rate how likely they would be to follow the
default action (“If I were living in Sweden, I would go with
the default”) and how much they would support the donation
policy (“In my own country, I would support this donation
policy”) (1= strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree).
Transfer Effect
Participants were given the option to actually donate real
money to a charity that they could otherwise keep for them-
selves. Participants were told that
For your participation in this study, you will be paid $0.50.We
would also like to offer you a bonus fee of up to $1.00, to
which you can choose how much to keep and how much to
donate to one of the most effective charities (as rated by the
Giving What You Can Research Centre). Please write below
in numerical form howmuch of this $1 youwould like to keep.
We will subtract this amount you choose to keep from the
$1.00 total and donate the rest directly to charity.
Upon completion of the study, all participants were fully
debriefed and the total money that participants chose to donate
from their bonus was donated to charity.
Results
Attitudes Toward Altruistic Policies
Independent samples t-tests revealed that there were no signifi-
cant differences between conditions in attitudes toward the al-
truistic policy. With regards to the self-reported likelihood of
following the default policy (whether that be the opt-out or
the consent-in tax), there were no significant differences be-
tween conditions, t(134) =!.84, p= .40, with comparable
means centered around the mid-point when the charity was
the default (M=3.99, SD=2.01) as to when the charity was
not the default (M=4.27, SD=1.93). In other words, partici-
pants reported themselves just as likely to follow either policy
when it was the default. Similarly, there were no significant
differences between conditions with regard to participants’
support of the policy, t(134) =!.40, p= .69, with comparable
means—again around the midpoint—when the charity was
the default (M=4.26, SD=2.07) as to when it was not
(M=4.40, SD=2.07). Therefore, participants expressed mode-
rate support for the default position on charitable giving—
whether or not this default was to give to charity.
Transfer Effect
Supporting H2c, an independent samples t-test revealed a sig-
nificant effect of condition on donation amounts, t(134) =2.42,
p= .02, with participants in the charity default condition
choosing to donate significantly more actual money to charity
at the end of the experiment (M=$0.43, SD=35.34) than in
the charity non-default condition (M=$0.29, SD=29.40).
Looking further at descriptive statistics, the median level of
donation for the charity default condition was $0.50, while
the median level of donation for the charity non-default condi-
tion was $0.20. Hence, with reference to the overall available
amount of $1.00, median donations were 30% higher when
charitable donations were presented as the default policy.
Discussion
The results found in Study 4 accord with our hypothesis that
the effects of default effects could transfer to a different
context: participants exposed to a policy where charitable
donations was a default would subsequently choose to donate
significantly more of a bonus reward for taking part in the study
to charity, presumably through a process of social norm activation
(H2c). These findings provide further indirect support of a social
norms-based account of default effects. Were default effects to
be explained solely through lack of effort or cognitive biases such
as loss aversion, it seems unlikely that a transfer account would be
observed from the default status in one context to similar behavior
(with no default option) in a second context. Rather, such findings
—particularly when taken together with the direct evidence of so-
cial norms driving default effects in Studies 1 to 3—are suggestive
of participants inferring a norm from the default status.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
How can the known preference for the default in a choice
situation—default effects—be used to nudge individuals
toward altruistic behavior for the greater good? In this paper,
we tested whether default effects would occur in altruistic con-
texts, and the extent to which this could be explained through
social norms. Across four studies, we found converging evi-
dence for two core hypotheses: that default effects exist in al-
truistic contexts and that this can be at least partially explained
through perceptions of social norms. In Studies 1–3, we found
that participants were more likely to—and perceived stronger
social norms to—donate money to charity when such a dona-
tion was presented as the default option. Further, such norms
—and particularly descriptive norms—mediated the effect of
condition on donation amounts. Finally, in Study 4, we tested
whether this norm-based default effect could transfer to other
situations and found that inferred social norms to donate as a
function of default status can transfer to other donations in a
similar context. Such results from our fourth study support
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the claim that a social norm is inferred from a default option,
rather than a singular recommendation for that particular
choice context. Taken together as a package, these findings
provide converging evidence for an important explanatory role
of social norms in understanding default effects.
Theoretical Implications
Our results are consistent with a broader theoretical framework
concerning social norms that has not previously been applied
to default effects. Our results suggest that in addition to
institutional-derived injunctive norms (as in the implied en-
dorsement account: McKenzie et al., 2006), both general in-
junctive and descriptive social norms are important. In
particular, this work extends the work of McKenzie and others
in directly highlighting the importance of descriptive norms. It
is of note that in the three studies in which we were able to test
the effects of defaults on perceived social norms and conduct a
mediation analysis, it was descriptive social norms that
showed the consistent pattern of mediation. Such results suggest
that descriptive social norms may be a more potent factor in
explaining default effects than the implied-endorsement account
might predict. Future work should, of course, explore this more
fully.
This theoretical integration with social norms helps to elu-
cidate when the default effects may be stronger—and when
they may be weaker, or non-existent. Research has demon-
strated that people are more likely to be influenced by social
norms when the two conditions hold: when the norms are per-
ceived to be relevant and when there is a perception of ambi-
guity about what should be carried out (Cialdini & Trost,
1998; Crutchfield, 1955; Reno et al., 1993). Our results sug-
gest that the strength of default effects will depend on the de-
gree of ambiguity evident in the situation and the extent to
which the implicitly inferred norms are perceived to be rele-
vant. Therefore, in exploring default effects, it is important
to recognize that all default choice contexts are not alike.
Practical Implications
In addition, the results presented in this paper may also have
significant practical implications for how altruistic behavior
can be encouraged to help relieve the effects of poverty and
climate change. Specifically, our work suggests that a simple,
practical, and efficient tool for increasing donations for chari-
ties could be to simply present that donation as a default in a
choice situation. We note that in Study 3, we found a very
large difference in donations to charity, with 81% of partici-
pants donating when such a donation was the default, com-
pared with only 19% when it was not. Such findings have
important practical implications. For example, such a default
policy might be implemented at a government level in tax
returns by presenting small charitable donation as a default
(to which individuals could easily opt out from if they
wished).
In discussing the practical implications of such work, it is
crucial to consider expected public acceptability, which can
have a strong influence on attitudes toward the policy and af-
fect the likelihood that a policy could be put into action effec-
tively (Schuitema & Jakobsson Bergstad, 2013). Of particular
relevance to the work suggested here is that policy measures
are more likely to be perceived as unacceptable when people
perceive an infringement to their freedom or if the costs for
not complying are too high (Jakobsson, Fujii, & Gärling,
2000). In implementing a default policy, however, both of
these key predictors of low acceptability are absent: placing
an altruistic donation as an opt-out default does not signifi-
cantly impinge on freedom and has low costs, for the donation
is wholly voluntary and optional, and people can opt out from
it with minimal effort (Loewenstein, Brennan, & Volpp, 2007;
Thaler & Sunstein, 2003). While we focused on altruistic and
self-sacrificial decisions, this work has broader implications
for encouraging prudential and moral behavior in a wide range
of social and financial interactions. By structuring the architec-
ture of choice, one hope is to encourage better behavior of citi-
zens, politicians, those involved in financial institutions, and
indeed all social actors. What constitutes “better behavior” is
a deep ethical question but one which we cannot avoid asking.
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions
The first key feature of the studies presented that requires further
discussion is that they utilized a strictly experimental design.
While some previous studies on default effects have had high
ecological validity, utilizing naturally occurring differences in
policies or systems (e.g., Choi et al., 2002), the nature of these
methods mean that it is often not possible to strictly control for
any extraneous variables that could have had played a confound-
ing role. In utilizing a controlled experimental design, we were
able to isolate changes in whether an option was the default or
not to gain confidence that the observed effect is due to the
change in the default option in particular. It remains true, how-
ever, that people’s behavior and opinions in controlled experi-
ments such as these may still differ in part from their behavior
in real-life default decisions, and so in future work, we hope to
conduct further experimental designs in a natural setting.
A second key feature of our design was that it allowed us to
assess not just predicted but actual donation behavior. It is
known that there can often be a discrepancy between planned
and actual behavior (e.g. Ajzen, 1991, Ajzen & Fishbein,
1980), such that while a default donation policy might lead
individuals to predict that they would donate more to a charity,
this intention might not translate into actual behavior. Our
design therefore allowed a measure of participants’ actual
altruistic donation behavior: participants were able to donate
some of their own reward money they had obtained for taking
part in the study. A remaining question, however, is the extent
to which this effect may continue outside the experimental
situation. As such, a fruitful area of future research would be
to investigate how knowledge of default policies in altruistic
domains may have a longer-lasting effect on positive behavior
outside of the experimental setting.
In this paper, we have presented converging evidence sug-
gesting that social norms play an important explanatory role in
default effects. Having established this relationship, future
research should be conducted to more fully explore how,
when, and why social norms impact upon default effects. As
discussed earlier, one of the most compelling future directions
is to consider how the relevance of implicitly perceived norms
(e.g. through relevant social group membership) impacts upon
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default effects. Further, it is important to explore how the so-
cial norms account interplays with other accounts posited in
explaining default effects (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). Our
analysis concerning social norms is not intended to replace
but rather to complement other explanations of default effects,
and it would be fruitful to explore the interplay between these
different potential processes. Having established that social
norms play an important role in explaining default effects, fu-
ture research is needed to explore how perceptions of social
norms may interact with lack of effort and anchoring to the sta-
tus quo to produce default effects. Do implicitly perceived so-
cial norms help to moderate the posited anchoring effect of
default choices? Are individuals less willing to expend effort
to choose the non-default action when the default action is per-
ceived as socially normative? In answering such questions, a
more complete and integrative understanding of default effects
can be sought.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided evidence for the existence of
default effects in immediate altruistic contexts, as well as dem-
onstrating an explanatory role for social norms. In four exper-
iments, we found that: (i) participants preferred the default
option in an altruistic choice contexts, that is, charitable dona-
tions; (ii) participants perceived the default option to be the so-
cially normative option; (iii) that perceptions of (primarily
descriptive) social norms mediated the effect of default condi-
tion on donation amounts; and (iv) participants translated
social norms they inferred from the default option in one domain
into behavior in a second, related domain, suggesting a transfer
effect in social norms.
Theoretically, our analysis situates default effects within a
comprehensive body of social psychological research concer-
ning social norms and the attitude-behavior relationship, pro-
viding novel empirical predictions. Practically, the evidence
presented in this paper highlights that the way that optional
donation policies are framed can have an important impact
on donation behavior. Such work suggests that making use
of default effects could be an effective tool to increase behavior
in the overall interest without compromising freedom. Samuel
Johnson (1751) famously said—“to do nothing is in every
man’s power.” While no doubt, in some cases, it is better to
do nothing than to act, we have shown that the passivity of human
choice and the tendency to be led by social norms and default
options can be harnessed to encourage more altruistic behavior.
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